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ABSTRACT
In the face of large-scale automated social engineering attacks to
large online services, fast detection and remediation of compro-
mised accounts are crucial to limit the spread of new attacks and
to mitigate the overall damage to users, companies, and the pub-
lic at large. We advocate a fully automated approach based on ma-
chine learning: we develop an early warning system that harnesses
account activity traces to predict which accounts are likely to be
compromised in the future and generate suspicious activity.We hy-
pothesize that this early warning is key for a more timely detection
of compromised accounts and consequently faster remediation.We
demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of the system through
an experiment at a large-scale online service provider using four
months of real-world production data encompassing hundreds of
millions of users. We show that—even using only login data to de-
rive features with low computational cost, and a basic model selec-
tion approach—our classifier can be tuned to achieve good classifi-
cation precision when used for forecasting. Our system correctly
identifies up to one month in advance the accounts later flagged
as suspicious with precision, recall, and false positive rates that
indicate the mechanism is likely to prove valuable in operational
settings to support additional layers of defense.
1 INTRODUCTION
Online services are an integral part of our personal and profes-
sional lives. To support widespread adoption and improve usabil-
ity, large-scale online service providers (LSOSPs) have made it sim-
ple for users to access any of the provided services using a single
credential. Such “single sign-on” systems make it much easier for
users to manage their interactions through a single account and
sign-in interface. As users become more invested in the platform,
the single login credential becomes a valuable key to a whole set
of services, as well as the ‘key’ to their digital identity and the per-
sonal information stored on the platform. As a consequence, these
credentials are highly attractive targets to attackers as well.
As LSOSPs improve their defense systems to protect their user
base, attackers have shifted their efforts to social engineering at-
tacks, e.g, attacks that exploit incorrect decisions made by individ-
ual users to trick them into disclosing their login credentials [13].
Once an account is compromised, the attackers hijack the account
from its legitimate owner and, typically, use it for their own pur-
poses [18]: for example, to evade detection while perpetuating an
attack (e.g., multi-stage phishing, ormalware distribution campaigns)
or to carry out other fraudulent activity (e.g., sending out spam
email).
Thus, detecting compromised accounts early and giving back
control to their legitimate owners quickly, and even designing de-
fense mechanisms that add additional layers of defense to protect
users likely to fall prey to social engineering attacks, is crucial. Do-
ing so can mitigate the damage an attacker can do while in con-
trol of a compromised account, protect the account owner’s digi-
tal identity, and reduce the damage inflicted by an automated large-
scale social-engineering attack to a LSOSP and its user community.
It should be noted that, detecting compromised accounts is much
more challenging than just identifying fake ones (i.e., those created
by an attacker) since, in such cases, suspicious activity is typically
interleaved with the account owner’s legitimate activity [7].
This paper tests the hypothesis that it is feasible to identify
likely future victims of mass-scale social-engineering attacks. In a
nutshell, we postulate that the behavioral patterns of the users that
have little incentives or low ability to fend off social-engineering
attacks can be learned. To this end we propose an early warning
system based on a completely automated pipeline using machine
learning (ML) to identify the accounts with similar behavioral pat-
terns to accounts that have been flagged as suspicious in the past.
We postulate that predicting accounts that are more likely to be
compromised in the future can be used to develop new defenses,
to fine-tune and better target existing defense mechanisms, as well
as to better protect vulnerable users [10]. For example, in the con-
text of online social networks, identifying potentially vulnerable
accounts - even with low accuracy - was sufficient to develop a
defense system for detecting fake accounts that significantly out-
performed other state of the art approaches [4]. While we briefly
discuss the intuition behind some of these defense mechanisms in
the discussion section (§8), their design and evaluation, however, is
beyond the scope of this paper and we focus here solely on evaluat-
ing our conjecture that predicting accounts which are more likely
to be compromised is feasible.
We have tested our hypothesis using real-world data from a
large LSOSP (i.e., at the scale of Amazon, Facebook, Google, Ya-
hoo, etc.). Throughout this paper we will refer to it as a LSOSP (in
1
Figure 1: Overview of the Life Cycle of a Compromised Account
italics, the non-italicized LSOSP refers to a generic Large-Scale On-
line Service Provider). Our experiments were carried out over four
months worth of production data covering hundreds of millions of
users generating hundreds of billions of login events to LSOSP’s
platform.
Overall, our results indicate that it is feasible to achieve good
classification accuracy as well as a low false positive rate. Our eval-
uation demonstrates that the proposed approach is not only feasi-
ble but also offers promising performance, based on which new or
improved defense mechanisms can be developed. It is important to
note that our results should be seen as a lower bound of achievable
classification performance, which can likely be further improved
by using richer data or additional computational resources (e.g., to
support more sophisticated learning methods) as we discuss in §8.
This paper makes the following contributions:
 We formulate the hypothesis that it is feasible to identify the
users more likely to fall prey to mass-scale social-engineering
attacks (§3), propose an approach to identify these accounts, and
outline the design of such an early warning system (§4).
 We demonstrate the feasibility and applicability of the proposed
approach on real-world productiondata (§6).We show that, even
using low-cost features extracted from two basic datasets (§5)
and a simple model selection approach (§4) for acceptable train-
ing runtime, the proposed classifier can be tuned to achieve good
classification quality based on recall, precision, and false posi-
tive rate metrics (§6). For example (§6.3), using only one week of
login event history and predicting one month in advance, our clas-
sifier predictsmore than half of the accounts later flagged as hav-
ing suspicious behaviour (i.e., achieves a recall of 50.62%) and, at
the same time, around one in five of the accounts predicted to
generate suspicious behaviour is actually labeled as suspicious
at LSOSP within a 30-day prediction horizon (i.e., precision of
18.33%, with a corresponding false positive rate of 0.49%).
2 BACKGROUND: ACCOUNT LIFE CYCLE
Figure 1 provides an overview of the typical life cycle of an account
that at some point is compromised (e.g., through a social engineer-
ing attack). After registering an account, a legitimate user starts
using the provided services. We refer to the behavioral patterns
over this time as the user’s normal behavior. Attackers may carry
out automated social engineering attacks that attempt to compro-
mise user accounts (e.g., falling for a phishing attack) [5, 13, 26].
If the attack is successful, the user becomes a victim of the attack
and her account is considered compromised, and eventually the
attacker may start to (mis)use the account. Typically, some time
is required before the defense systems employed by LSOSPs can
identify such activity and, in turn, flag the account as suspicious.
At that stage, remedial procedures at the LSOSP start to take
place [9]. For example, a popular low-costmeasure is to useCAPTCHAs
to make it more difficult for an attacker to automate the use of
compromised accounts. The protective measures can be escalated
and extra challenges can be then thrown at identified suspicious
accounts such as prompting for answers to secret questions, or sec-
ond factor authentication (2FA) through another service or through
a mobile device. Their goal is to prevent the attacker from contin-
uing to use the account while providing the legitimate user with
somemeans of regaining control. After remediation, the user takes
back control of her account. The account is no longer compromised
and the observed behavioral patterns return back to normal over
time.
If the suspicious behavior persists, the employed protectivemea-
sures can be escalated again to limit potential damage to other
users on the platform. For example, the LSOSP can quarantine the
suspicious account (e.g., impose rate limits on the outbound mes-
sages or deny certain types of service) or even suspend it.
We note that fake accounts, i.e., accounts created by the attacker
from the beginning, share some of the same phases during their
lifetime as those discussed above for legitimate accounts. Fake ac-
counts are typically disguised to appear legitimate in order to evade
detection for as long as possible. For example, realistic looking pro-
files can be faked, normal behavioral patterns can be emulated, and
fake accounts can be registered through unique IP addresses to
avoid clustering.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We present a formal description of our problem by abstracting
away from all company- and experiment-specific details. We de-
scribe those details in §4, §5 and §6 respectively. Here, we go over
the assumptions and objectives that influenced our approach, we
elaborate on the datasets required to carry out the classification
task (§3.2), andwe introduce our classification exercises (CEs), which
are the means by which we organize our experiments (§3.3).
3.1 Overview
Our goal is to develop an early warning system that can be used by
LSOSPs to harness observable legitimate user behavior to identify ac-
counts likely to be labeled as suspicious in the future. Our intuition is
the following: over the course of everyday use, the history of user
interactions encapsulates information from which one can infer
whether an account is more likely to be compromised (e.g., because
the user does not have the interest or the ability to fend off social-
engineering attacks); eventually (some of) these accounts are com-
promised, generate suspicious activity, and may later be flagged. In
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other words, to forecast future suspicious activity, we aim for fea-
tures that approximate user behavioral patterns to infer similarity
to legitimate accounts that are later flagged as suspicious.
We are developing a binary classifier to act as an early warning
system. We chose a supervised machine learning classifier as, over
the past few years, such approaches have been shown to achieve
good performance for a variety of classification tasks [15, 20, 21].
3.2 Assumptions, Objectives, and Datasets
Assumptions.We treat the prediction of suspicious accounts as a
binary classification problem (suspicious vs. non-suspicious). We
assume that only a small subset of the overall population is likely
to exhibit suspicious activity. We believe that this is true for large
providers that offer services to a large number of users around the
world (up to billions of users) and dedicate resources to maintain
a ‘healthy’ user population. The direct implication is that the ML
techniques used, the data selection for the training of the classifiers,
and the success metrics used are all tuned for imbalanced data.
Objectives. We aim to meet the following objectives when design-
ing and tuning the binary classifier. First, a low rate of false posi-
tives: accounts incorrectly predicted as suspicious (i.e., false posi-
tives) should be minimized even at the cost of decreasing the num-
ber of correctly predicted suspicious accounts (i.e., true positives).
This trade-off can be controlled by tuning the classifier’s predic-
tion threshold when generating the final binary classification. We
also discuss tuning for a low rate of false negatives in (§8).
Second, and crucially for deployment at a LSOSP, the classifier
should be optimized for runtime efficiency during both training
(feature extraction and model building) and testing/use (predic-
tion and classification). This can be accomplished by employing
features that can be easily extracted/computed from the raw data,
and by choosingMLmodels that offer a good trade-off between the
quality of prediction and performance. Balancing this trade-off is
crucial for timely forecasting of suspicious activity and thus faster
remediation (as well as adoption in realistic settings).
Required Datasets. We assume that the LSOSP has access to at
least two types of data. First, data that can be mined to extract be-
havioral patterns. Second, a sample of accounts previously flagged
as suspicious is required as ground truth.We detail the data we use
from LSOSP in §5.
3.3 Experiment Organization
Here we establish the terminology we use for the rest of this pa-
per. We define the means by which we organize our experiments
(Classification Exercises) and we detail the categories of accounts
that can be observed in the datasets and how we use them.
AClassificationExercise (CE) is ourway of grouping together
all parameters of a binary classification experiment (e.g., training
time interval, testing time interval, ML model hyperparameters)
and the associated results. As with any typical ML approach, a
CE is divided into two distinct phases: training and testing (Fig-
ure. 2 provides an overview). During training, our goal is to fit a
model that learns user behavioral patterns that can be used as early
predictors of suspicious account activity. During testing, the fitted
Table 1: Set Notation Summary
Symbol Description
U Set of all registered accounts
Ld Set of accounts with login activity on day d
Sd Set of accounts flagged as suspicious on day d
Ad Set of accounts under attacker control on day d
Fd Set of fake accounts on day d
Cd Set of compromised accounts on day d
LSCE Set of accounts labeled as suspicious during a CE
PCE Set of accounts predicted as suspicious during a CE
model is applied to new data not seen during training and the clas-
sifier’s performance is evaluated against a labeled ground truth.
Categories of Accounts. Table 1 presents a summary of the set
notation used to categorize user accounts. We considerU as the set
of all accounts registered with the LSOSP. Depending on the scale
and popularity of the LSOSP, U can be extremely large potentially
exceeding a billion users.
We use days as a coarse-grain measure of time. We consider Ld
as the set of users with login activity on day d. For the set Ld , we
extract easy-to-compute low-cost features representing the users’
login behavior on day d. We aim to learn the behavioral patterns of
legitimate accounts prior to them being flagged as suspicious and,
as such, require some information about accounts later flagged as
having suspicious behaviour. We denote with Sd the set of user
accounts flagged as suspicious on day d. Existence of an account
in set Sd on day d is a clear indication that the account exhibited
some suspicious activity prior to or on day d.
However, it is important to note that the opposite is not true: if
an account is absent from the set Sd on day d that does not imply
that it did not exhibit any irregular activity prior to or on day d.
The reason for this is that the pipeline used for detecting suspicious
accounts at the LSOSP is expected to have some lag. In other words,
it takes time for an account to be flagged as suspicious after it first
starts exhibiting irregular behavior.
AvoidingAacker-ControlledAccounts. The set Ld contains not
only legitimate user accounts but also those that are under the con-
trol of an attacker (the set Ad ). These include fake as well as com-
promised accounts (considered as sets Fd andCd respectively).We
implement several heuristics to prune such accounts and avoid learn-
ing user behavioral patterns from accounts that may be under at-
tacker control. We discuss this preprocessing step in detail in §4.3.
Classification exercise data. This data cleaning leads to LSCE ,
the set of labeled accounts during our CE (where LSCE ⊆ Sd { d | d
∈ Training Interval }). We denote the set of accounts our pipeline
forecasts as suspicious during a CE as PCE . To evaluate the quality
of our predictions, we then compare the accounts in PCE to the
ground truth in the testing interval (Sd { d | d ∈ Testing Interval }).
Formalization. During training, a CE uses as input both Ld and
Sd { d | d ∈ Training Interval } with some pre-processing to avoid
learning from attacker controlled accounts. The output after train-
ing is the fitted model M . The set of labels used as ground truth
when fitting the model is LSCE ≈ Sd − (Fd ∪Cd ) { d | d ∈ Training
Interval }. During testing, the inputs are the fitted modelM and Ld
{ d | d ∈ Testing Interval }. The output of the CE is the set of pre-
dicted suspicious accounts PCE that are evaluated against a labeled
ground truth from Sd { d | d ∈ Testing Interval } .
3
SuccessMetrics.Based on our formalization above, the outcomeof
the binary classifier can only fall in one of four possible categories:
True Positive TP = PCE ∩ Sd , False Positive FP = PCE − Sd , True
Negative TN = (PCE ∪ Sd )
∁ , and False Negative FN = Sd − PCE ,
where { d | d ∈ Testing Interval }. Based on these one can derive
classification precision, recall, accuracy and false positive rate.
4 PROPOSED APPROACH
This section outlines our proposed approach: the details of our clas-
sification exercises (§4.1), the proposed ML pipeline (§4.2), and the
heuristics we implement to avoid learning from accounts under
the control of an attacker and to reduce bias when evaluating our
approach (§4.3). The following sections describe our datasets (§5)
and the evaluation results (§6).
4.1 Classification Exercise Composition
We organize our classification exercises (CEs) as outlined in Fig-
ure 2. During training, we attempt to fit a model (M) that learns
which behavioral patterns during the training DataWindow (training-
DW1) correlated to the account being labeled as suspicious later in
the Label Window (LW). We introduce a Buffer Window (BW) be-
tween the DW and LW, to account for any lag (delay) in the suspi-
cious account flagging pipeline used to generate the ground truth
of suspicious accounts. The reason is that, in the absence of the
BW, a lag in the pipeline will cause the fitted model to learn user
behavioral patterns from accounts that are already under the con-
trol of an attacker. In §4.3, we present our heuristics to estimate
the width of the Buffer Window (BW).
During testing, the fitted model (M) obtained during training, is
applied during the testing-DW to forecast the set of accounts that
are likely to have suspicious behaviour (PCE ). The quality of those
predictions is then evaluated against the ground truth of labeled
suspicious accounts extracted from the testing-LW.
4.2 The Early Warning Pipeline
Our system is composed of a pipeline that can be easily integrated
into existing systems (outlined in Figure 3).We note that our pipeline
design stresses efficiency, scalability, and, ultimately, achieving a
practical training runtime sometimes even to the detriment of the
learned classifiers (e.g., using simple low-cost features as opposed
to sophisticated feature extraction). With production data, similar
in scale to what we have access to at LSOSP, our pipeline is de-
signed to extract behavioral patterns and to train in reasonable
time on log traces from hundreds of millions of accounts leading
to hundreds of billions of log entries over the duration of each CE.
We developed our pipeline in Scala 2.11, employed SparkML for
all our developed classifiers, and ran our CEs on Spark 2.0.2 [28].
Data Pre-Processing.We pre-process the datasets from which we
extract the user behavioral patterns (e.g., login activity dataset) as
well as the ground truth (e.g., accounts flagged as suspicious). Im-
portantly, we also carry out a series of pruning operations in order
to exclude accounts that may bias either learning or evaluation as
discussed in §4.3. During this stage, for each account, we extract
1Where the context makes the notation unambiguous, we skip the prefix and use DW
only for training-DW or testing-DW. Similarly for LW.
features at the day level and aggregate them for the intervals asso-
ciated with the classification exercise. There is an inherent tradeoff
here: extracting and computing a large number of features over a
long duration of time could potentially include more behavioral
information thereby increasing the prediction accuracy. However,
this comes at the cost of longer run-time and might affect pre-
diction timeliness. At LSOSP, we find that extracting only a rela-
tively small set of low-cost features that are both simple and quick
enough to compute is both sufficient and also more practical from
a performance perspective in a production environment (details
in §5).
Pre-processing Imbalanced Data. Typically at LSOSPs, suspicious
accounts (the positive class) are a minority compared to the over-
all population. Naively training an ML classifier on such imbal-
anced data will typically result in a classifier that always predicts
the dominant class (the negative class in our case) to achieve the
highest accuracy [19]. Approaches tomitigate this problem include
simple preprocessing techniques such as undersampling themajor-
ity class or oversampling the minority class [11], or Cost-Sensitive
Learning [16] that attempts to minimize the cost of misclassifica-
tions by assigning asymmetrical costs during the training process.
At LSOSP , given the scale of the data and our focus on building a
practical pipeline with good balance between runtime and classifi-
cation performance, we use undersampling during training (how-
ever, we test on the whole set of labeled data in the test set).
Classifier Tuning. Second, during the hyperparameter optimiza-
tion stage, model selection is carried out in order to find the best
model (or set of parameters) for the classification task. This only
needs to be done once during training (or periodically, with low
frequency and offline, to learn new user behavioral patterns) and
is not carried out during inference using the fitted model in pro-
duction. We use a Random Forest (RF) classifier considering the
good trade-off it offers between runtime and classification accu-
racy [8]. We carry out the hyperparameter optimization on an in-
dependent dataset extracted from the available history and specif-
ically reserved for this purpose (§6.1). The extracted model param-
eters are then fixed for all the subsequent CEs.
Model Fiing and Inference. Third, after data preprocessing and
hyperparameter tuning, a ML model M is fitted and later applied
to make predictions on new data (i.e., inference). On the one hand,
this data could be one for which there already exists labeled ground
truth. In that case, the goal is to evaluate the performance of the de-
veloped classifier. On the other hand, this could be new data from
production for which no ground truth exists (i.e., during the real-
world deployment) and in this case, the goal is to put the classifier
into practice to predict accounts likely to generate suspicious ac-
tivity in the future based on their recent behavioral patterns.
Model Evaluation. Finally, we carry out model evaluation as the
last stage in our pipeline. We obtain the confusion matrix com-
paring the ground truth with the resulting predictions and collect
statistical measures of the classifier’s performance.
4.3 Heuristics
Our goal is to learn behaviour from legitimate accounts (i.e., that
are not attacker-controlled: fake and compromised accounts — Ad
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Figure 2: Overviewof a Classification Exercise (CE). Each exercise is divided into two broad phases: training, during which the classifier
is fitted, and testing, during which the classifier predictions are evaluated. Each phase is subdivided into smaller non-overlapping time
windows: Data Window (DW), Buffer Window (BW) and Label Window (LW). The DW is the period of time over which behavioural features
are mined. The BW is a period of time introduced to avoid learning from accounts that may already be compromised but not yet labeled as
such. The LW is the period over which labels are extracted.
Figure 3: Overview of the Machine Learning Pipeline
Table 2: Ground Truth Lag Experiment Results
Lag (in days) Cumulative Percentage of Accounts (%)
1 74.31%
2 78.90%
3 81.98%
4 84.89%
5 86.50%
6 88.59%
7 90.00%
21 98.59%
28 100%
{ d | d ∈ Training Interval }) and predict which legitimate accounts
may later get compromised and become labeled as suspicious. To
this end we use a number of heuristics. We also implement addi-
tional heuristics to increase the confidence in our evaluation re-
sults.
Heuristics to increase the chance that we capture only the
behaviour of accounts under the control of legitimate users.
During training, we attempt to exclude all accounts that are po-
tentially under the control of an attacker. In practice, the set of
accounts Ad is unknown, even for historical data for which there
is collected ground truth, as this set may include not-yet-detected
fakes and compromised accounts. We take advantage of the fact
that we have an extremely large dataset to carry out aggressive
exclusions that reduce the chance that we capture behaviour from
attacker-controlled accounts. We use three heuristics: First, we ex-
clude any account flagged as suspicious during the training DW
or at a later point of time within the Buffer Window (BW). By ex-
cluding these accounts, we reduce the likelihood that our classifier
learns behavioral patterns stemming from detected compromised
accounts. Second, to the same end, for the classification exercises
where there is available data before the start of the training in-
terval (§6.3), we exclude accounts flagged as suspicious before the
start of training (as they are more likely to be compromised in the
future). Finally, to eliminate fakes, one of our classification exer-
cises (§6.3) attempts to eliminate all recently-created or dormant
fakes by selecting for training only accounts that are older than
two months old and have at least one month of activity (our as-
sumption is that once fakes generate enough activity the LSOSP
can detect them through existing techniques [24, 27] as detecting
fakes is easier than detecting compromised accounts [7]).
Heuristics to reduce bias during classifier evaluation.Our pre-
liminary experiments suggest that user accounts that have been
flagged as suspicious in the past are more likely to be flagged again
in the future (a possible indication that their users are more vul-
nerable to attacks than the general user population). To provide a
conservative (lower-bound) evaluation of the developed classifier’s
performance, we exclude all accounts that have been previously
labeled as suspicious during training (i.e., flagged at any point dur-
ing the training-LW or before). Moreover, one of our classification
exercises (§6.3), also excludes any accounts flagged as suspicious
during the first month of the data collection. As a result, the devel-
oped classifier is evaluated on never seen before true positives.
Heuristics to size the buffer window (BW). It is expected that,
at any LSOSP, detection of suspicious activity is not instantaneous,
thus accounts may be under the control of an attacker for a while
before they are flagged. We developed an experiment to estimate
how aggressive is LSOSP’s suspicious activity flagging pipeline.
For this experiment, we only rely on two types of events: flagging
events for accounts marked as suspicious on day d (extracted from
set Sd ) and login events for these accounts (extracted from set Ld ).
For this experiment we include only user accounts that have at
least one login event and at least one flagging event within the pe-
riod of time over which we run the experiment. We define the lag
per flagged user as the number of days between the first time that
account is flagged and the most recent previous login event.
We run this experiment to gain some intuition for the lag of the
flagging pipeline over a period of 30 days. As shown in Table 2,
90% of accounts flagged within that period have a lag of at most
one week and 98.6% have a lag of less than three weeks. As such,
we decided on a 1-week buffer window (BW) for most of our CEs,
yet we also experiment with a 3-week BW (§6.4).
5 DATASETS
Overall, we have access to 118 days (≈4 months or ≈16 weeks)
worth of production data collected from September 1st, 2016 to the
December 27th, 2016. Overall, these datasets are representative of
any LSOSP with a global user base, an extensive set of offered on-
line services, as well as the latest techniques to identify potentially
compromised accounts.
5.1 Extracting Features
We have access to two datasets extracted and updated daily from
production servers. The first is a dataset that includes features as-
sociated with all login events. Whenever a user logs-in to a service
offered by LSOSP or has her session re-authenticated, a login event
is recorded into this dataset with all relevant features that can be
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Table 3: Summary of Low-Cost Features. (from login traces)
Brief Description Type
# Login Attempts
Numeric
# Unique Login Sources (e.g., Web Login, Mobile Login, etc.)
# Unique Login Types (e.g., Password Login, Account Switch, etc.)
# Unique Login Statuses (e.g., Success, Session Extension, etc.)
# Unique Password Login Statuses (e.g., Success, Invalid Password, etc.)
# Unique Actions (e.g., Login/Logout, Device Authentication, etc.)
# Unique Login Geographical Locations
# Unique Login Geographical Location Statuses
(e.g., Neutral Location, White-listed Location, etc.)
# Unique Login Autonomous Systems (ASNs)
# Unique Login User Agents (e.g., Browser, Mobile App, etc.)
# Successful Logins
# Unsuccessful Logins
User has a ’verified’ mobile number 2-Categorical
associated with the event at that time. We use this dataset to ex-
tract a minimal set of 13 basic and easy to compute features that
reflect users’ behavioral patterns (summarized in Table 3) from lo-
gin traces at a day-level granularity, and then aggregate them for
each user account as a way of characterizing its behavioral pattern
over the DW. It is important to note that we do not have access
to any fine-grained account features such as account/user details.
Importantly, we do not have access to any personally identifiable
information. Moreover, given the diversity of the login methods
as well as the services offered at LSOSP, the features extracted for
each login event are not uniform and the set of features extracted
for each user is sparse.
5.2 Groundtruth: Suspicious Account Flagging
At LSOSP, a list of accounts flagged as suspicious is generated daily
by combining information from various sources that include hu-
man content moderators, manual reports from internal teams, user
reporting, in addition to automated systems employing heuristics
(that include clustering techniques to identify anomalies, and re-
gression models to identify spammers). We use this daily list of ac-
counts flagged as suspicious as our ground truth: we extract labels
for accounts indicating whether it has been flagged as suspicious
or not during the training/testing intervals.
Accounts flagged as suspicious may include compromised ac-
counts, as well as fake accounts. It is worth noting that, on the
one hand, flagging is a result of undesired behavior exhibited by
an account (e.g., sending spam), that is then subsequently detected
either manually by moderators or automatically by some internal
security system. On the other hand, this may be due to association
or similarity with prior flagged suspicious accounts in terms of ac-
count behavioral characteristics (e.g., accounts logging in from a
blacklisted autonomous system).
For this study, we had access to the daily list of accounts flagged
as suspicious and a high-level description of the system. The de-
tailed internals of the flagging pipeline were not available. As a
consequence, we are neither able to distinguish between the differ-
ent classes of suspicious accounts nor to identify the reason why
a particular account had been flagged. We believe that, the lack of
such fine-grained information poses limited threats to the validity
of our findings: on the one side we have developed heuristics to
exclude attacker-controlled accounts from training (see §4.3), and,
on the other side, at this point our machine learning model aims to
provide only predictive power (will an account be flagged as sus-
picious?) rather than explanatory power (why will the account be
flagged?). We extend this discussion in §8.
6 EVALUATION RESULTS
The Objectives of our Classification Exercises.We present four
of the classification exercises (CEs) carried out at LSOSP labeled
CEA, CEB , CEC , and CED in Table 4. The table outlines the Train-
ing and Testing intervals assigned to each CE and their respec-
tive DataWindow (DW), BufferWindow (BW), and Label Window
(LW). For each CE, we have a specific objective:
 CEA: evaluating the feasibility of our proposed pipeline, its ap-
plicability at LSOSP, and optimizing hyperparameters.
 CEB : testing the tuned model on new data to ensure that no
overfitting occurred in CEA.
 CEC : investigating how the performance of our classifier changes
when excluding accounts previously flagged as suspicious (higher
chance to be flagged again) or accounts that have little previous
activity (lower chance to include fakes).
 CED : evaluating the impact of more training data (longer data
and labelwindows) andmore aggressive exclusion of potentially
not-yet-flagged attacker-controlled accounts (longer buffer win-
dow).
Summary of Results. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results for
all CEs carried out (their setup is outlined in Table 4). For concise-
ness, we focus here only on the most relevant metrics 2 we col-
lected. The two tables highlight how several metrics are impacted
by the selected operating thresholdT of the classifier as well as by
the duration of the prediction horizon (presented as Test-LW and
Extended-Test-LW in Table 4 and whose combined size in days is
denoted as the prediction horizon:H ). The tables present results for
T = 0.5 and T = 0.9 and the values of H = 7, 21, 30, 34, 90 days , in
separate columns. Note that the minimum and maximum values of
H vary, depending on the CE.
In summary, these results show:
 High accuracy (ACC) ≈99.9% and low false positive rate (FPR)
<0.01% for an operating threshold T = 0.9,
 Good evidence for the absence of overfiting (CEB in §6.2),
 Goodbalance between precision (PRE) and recall (REC):≈18.33%
and ≈50.62% respectively, when forecasting with a Horizon H =
30 days and Operating Threshold T = 0.5 (CEC in §6.3),
 Asmall improvement after excluding recent/no activity accounts
(more likely to be fakes) and those flagged as suspicious before
training (Comparing CEB and CEC ),
 As the Horizon (H) increases, precision increases while recall
stays roughly constant (We expand on this in §6.5),
 High AUC as shown in Figure 5 (≈0.947% for CED in §6.4), and
 More training data and a more aggressive exclusion of not-yet-
flagged attacker-controlled accounts do not significantly impact
classification performance (CED in §6.4).
2 Notation used in Tables 5 and 6: AUC-Area Under Receiver Operating Characteristic
Curve, BTR-%-tile better than a random classifier, PRE-Precision, REC-Recall, ACC-
Accuracy, FPR-False Positive Rate. Values in bold represent the best result for that
performance metric.
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Table 4: Summaryof Classification Exercises (CEs).Notation: DW - DataWindow, BW - BufferW, LW - LabelW, H - Prediction Horizon
CE
Week
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
A
Train Test Extended Test
DW BW LW DW LW Extended LW (H = [7, 90] days)
B
Unused Train Test Extended Test
Unused DW BW LW DW LW Extended LW
C
Pre-Process Unused Train Test Extended Test
Pre-Process Unused DW BW LW DW LW Extended LW
D
Train Test Ext. Test
DW BW LW DW LW Ext. LW
6.1 Pipeline Tuning (CEA)
CEA uses data from the first five weeks of our traces for hyperpa-
rameter optimization. After a grid search, we extracted the hyper-
parameters of the best performing RF Classifier and fixed these for
all the other CEs.
Our classifier performs well even for this heavily imbalanced
dataset. The AUC attained is 0.928 that is 85.61% better than the
performance of a completely random classifier (with its AUC of
0.5). Note that at deployment, a LSOSP can tune the classifier to
achieve the desired balance between precision and recall by adjust-
ing the classifier’s operating thresholdT as highlighted by compar-
ing the corresponding PRE/REC results in Tables 5 and 6, and in
Figure 5.
To pick only one datapoint from this experiment and highlight the
performance of our classifier: more than one in four of the predicted
accounts are actually later flagged to have suspicious activity within
the next 90 days (PRE=24.99%), and our classifier uncovers almost one
third of the accounts later flagged as suspicious (REC=31.02%) with
a low false positive rate (FPR=0.42%).
6.2 Testing for Over-fitting (CEB )
To test for overfitting, through data reuse due to the hyperparam-
eter optimization in CEA, we repeated the same CE on entirely
new data, while using exactly the same experimental parameters.
The model parameters identified during the hyperparameter op-
timization stage (CEA) are reused for the rest of our CEs as well.
CEB uses the data collected over the last eight weeks of our traces:
five weeks of data are used for training/testing similar toCEA; this
leaves three extra weeks of ground truth to explore the impact of
a longer prediction horizon H (in §6.5).
The classifier maintains the same levels of performance as in
CEA (and these general trends are consistent across all CEs, none
reusingCEA data). This suggests no overfitting forCEA, and that the
performance of the classifier is generally stable with different param-
eters (training/testing intervals, time windows, etc.).
6.3 Excluding New/Pre-Flagged Accounts (CEC )
Next, we investigate how the performance of our proposed clas-
sifier changes when we aggressively exclude accounts previously
flagged as suspicious and accounts that have little past activity to
increase the chance that we learn behaviours from accounts con-
trolled only by legitimate users as explained in §4.3.CEC excludes
accounts that do not have any login activity within the one month
pre-processing interval at the start of the experiment and any ac-
counts that are flagged as suspicious within that same one month
interval. With this extra pre-processing step, while there was a
Table 5: Summary of Results using an Operating Threshold (T) = 0.5 for Different Prediction Horizons (H days).2
CE
Performance Evaluation Metrics
HMin HMax
H=HMin H=7 H=21 H=30 H=HMax
AUC BTR PRE REC ACC FPR PRE REC PRE REC PRE REC
A 7 90 0.928 85.61% 6.38% 46.87% 99.43% 0.52% 19.79% 45.81% 20.14% 43.81% 24.99% 31.02%
B 7 30 0.910 82.14% 3.78% 41.26% 99.50% 0.46% 18.18% 46.82% 19.98% 42.28% 19.98% 42.28%
C 7 30 0.922 84.42% 3.18% 42.96% 99.38% 0.58% 16.58% 57.32% 18.33% 50.62% 18.33% 50.62%
D 21 34 0.947 89.41% H < HMin 10.64% 57.42% 11.68% 48.96% 12.34% 48.13%
Table 6: Summary of Results using an Operating Threshold (T) = 0.9 for Different Prediction Horizons (H days).2
CE
Performance Evaluation Metrics
HMin HMax
H=HMin H=HMin H=HMax
AUC BTR PRE REC ACC FPR PRE REC ACC FPR
A 7 90 0.928 85.61% 12.92% 0.47% 99.92% 0.0024% 33.99% 0.20% 99.54% 0.0018%
B 7 30 0.910 82.14% 7.11% 13.15% 99.88% 0.0760% 35.96% 12.90% 99.74% 0.0520%
C 7 30 0.922 84.42% 6.91% 15.57% 99.86% 0.0940% 35.33% 16.29% 99.75% 0.0650%
D 21 34 0.947 89.41% 26.19% 14.45% 99.86% 0.0430% 28.47% 11.36% 99.82% 0.0420%
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Figure 4: Impact of thePredictionHorizon onPrecision (left)
and Recall (right) at operating threshold T = 0.5
small improvement in performance, we did not observe any ma-
jor impact. This is an indication that fakes are unlikely to be a major
problem at LSOSP.
6.4 Expanding the Training Data and BW (CED )
Finally, as an extra experiment, we test our proposed classifier’s
performance when we increase the volume of training data, and
aggressively increase the duration of the Buffer Window. To this end,
we decided to employ three week windows (for DW, BW, LW dur-
ing training/testing respectively) as opposed to one week. ForCED ,
the proposed classifier attained the highest AUC among all our CEs
≈0.947 (89.41% better than random). The classifier also achieved a
PRE and REC of 10.64% and 57.42% respectively atH = 21 days and
T = 0.5. At T = 0.9, precision reached 28.47%, recall 11.3% and the
FPR an impressive 0.04% (at H = 34 days).
6.5 The Impact of the Prediction Horizon
Our classifier’s precision markedly improves with the depth of the
prediction horizonH (Figure 4). Some of the accounts that are false
positives for a small precision window then become true positives
as the prediction window increases. We speculate that those ac-
counts are owned by users that do not have the ability or the inter-
est to fend off social engineering attacks, and thus a longer horizon
increases the chance that they fall victim to an attack, and then
generate suspicious activity which gets them flagged during the
longer prediction horizon.
We note that although precision increases with the prediction
horizon, recall only stays stable (Figure 4). We hypothesize that
the reason is that, during training, our classifier learns behavioral
patterns from a discrete set of attacks only. As new attacks are
developed, new categories of users become compromised and then
their behavior is labeled as suspicious (yet our classifier can not
label them as it has not been exposed to this data).
6.6 Feature Importance
Since we chose a Random Forest binary classifier, we can extract
information regarding the relative importance of the features se-
lected. ForCEA the top four most important features are: the num-
ber of distinct geographic locations (20.07%), the number of suc-
cessful login events (15.94%), the number of distinct ASNs (15.14%),
and the number of unsuccessful logins (8.697%). While the relative
importance of the features does not give an intuition as to why
those features are suitable for the early identification of suspicious
accounts in particular, they indicate that the same set of features
that are typically used to flag suspicious accounts after the fact can
also be used as early warning signs. We omit the relative feature
importances for the rest of the CEs as they do not differ signifi-
cantly from those presented for CEA.
7 RELATED WORK
Statisticalmethods (includingML) have achieved widespread adop-
tion within LSOSPs not only to provide rich business features (e.g.,
product recommendations) but also for cybersecurity purposes. For
instance, such approaches have been used for detecting compro-
mised accounts, fake accounts, spam, and phishing. None of these
approaches has focused on evaluating the feasibility of predict-
ing which legitimate accounts are more vulnerable and likely to
be compromised in the future (our long term aim). In this section
each paragraph focuses on a specific area, surveys some related ap-
proaches, and outlines the statistical methods and features used.
Compromised Accounts. Egele et al. [7] combined statistical
modeling and anomaly detection techniques in order to detect com-
promised accounts on Online Social Networks (OSNs). Their ap-
proach was based on identifying sudden changes in user behav-
ioral patterns in addition to observing whether those changes are
common to a large group of accounts therefore potentially a re-
sult of a malicious campaign. Thomas et al. [23] employed clus-
tering and classification (via logistic regression) in order to de-
tect account hijacking on Twitter. Their approach was based on
the observation that legitimate account owners frequently delete
tweets posted via their accounts after recognizing the compromise.
Those deletions are thus used as a feature to retroactively identify
hijacked accounts and clustering is then used to detect similarly
compromised accounts. Zhang et al. [29] made use of a ML-based
approach to automatically detect compromised accounts at a large
academic institution. Their approach employed logistic regression
on features extracted from web login and VPN authentication logs.
Fake Accounts. Yang et al. [27] proposed approaches to iden-
tify Sybil (i.e., fake) accounts on the Renren OSN. One approach
was based on ML and employed Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
on basic user-level features (e.g., the frequency of friendship re-
quests and the fraction of accepted incoming friendship requests).
Wang el al. [24] instead used clustering to identify fake accounts
on Renren. Their approach clustered users with similar behavior
based on features extracted from their clickstreams (e.g., the aver-
age session length, the average number of clicks per session).
Spam. Benevenuto et al. [2] developed an ML-based approach
to identify spammers on Twitter. Their approach was based on a
non-linear Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifer with the Ra-
dial Basis Function (RBF) kernel and made use of both content-
and user-level features (e.g., the age of the user account, the num-
ber of followers, the average number of URLs per tweet). Castillo
et al. [6] developed a ML-based approach using cost-sensitive deci-
sion trees to detect spam pages on theWeb. Their approach makes
use of content- and link-based features extracted from the Web
graph (e.g., the ratio between the average degree of a page and that
of its neighbours, number of words in the page/title). In the con-
text of email spam, Blanzieri et al. [3] carried out a survey of many
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of the approaches to detect email spam proposed in the literature
based on statistical methods (including ML).
Phishing. Ludl et al. [17] developed a ML-based approach to
identify phishing web pages. Their approachwas based on the C4.5
decision tree algorithm and made use of features extracted from a
page’s content as well as its URL (e.g., the number of forms/fields
tags on the page, whether the page is served over HTTPS, whether
the URL’s domain appears on a Google whitelist). Whittaker et
al. [25] developed a scalable ML-based approach to detect phish-
ing websites that is used to maintain Google’s phishing blacklist
automatically. Their approach is based on a Random Forest (RF)
classifier and employed both content-, host- and URL-based fea-
tures (e.g., PageRank, the host geolocation/ASN).
8 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Summary. We explore the feasibility of predicting the legitimate
(i.e., not attacker-controlled) accounts more likely to generate sus-
picious activity in the future, a likely indication that they have
fallen for a mass-scale social engineering attack. To this end, we
propose an earlywarning system that employs supervisedmachine
learning to identify the accounts whose behavioral patterns indi-
cate that they are similar to other legitimate accounts that have
been eventually labeled as suspicious in the past. We implement
this early warning system at a Large-Scale Online Service Platform
(LSOSP) and evaluate it on four months of real-world production
data covering hundreds ofmillions of users. Our evaluation demon-
strates that our approach is not only feasible but that it also offers
promising classification performance based on which further de-
fense mechanisms can be developed as we discuss below.
Discussion.We continue by exploring several interrelated topics:
How can a defense system use information about which users are
likely to be compromised in the future, and thus more ‘vulnerable’,
to enhance its robustness? User vulnerability can be thought of as
an additional ‘signal’ that can inform a number of defense mecha-
nisms. For example, it can: (i) serve as an indicator to prioritize the
allocation of limited defense resources (e.g., use of human analyst
time [12], or compute-intensive filters [22]), (ii) support differenti-
ated defenses that take into account user vulnerability (e.g., addi-
tional CAPTCHAs on login attempts into vulnerable accounts [1],
or imposing rate limits on the outbound messages of vulnerable
users to slow-down the spread ofmulti-stage — and potentially epi-
demic — phishing attacks), (iii) enable faster remediation of com-
promised accounts (e.g., by enabling more efficient inspection cam-
paigns that focus on the accounts of vulnerable users instead of the
entire user population [14]), (iv) facilitate the detection of the ori-
gin of an attack (as, in effect, the differentiated response between
vulnerable and robust users to similar interactions initiated by the
same source can be used as a weak yet effective signal [4]); and
(v) even facilitate the detection of new attacks (as, in effect, the
differentiated response between vulnerable and robust — yet oth-
erwise similar — user groups to the same ‘stimuli’ is an indication
of an attack). We explore the use of such information for several
cybersecurity domains in [10].
Figure 5: ROCs for all Classification Exercises.
Is the prediction quality good enough? Even if defense mechanisms
based on vulnerability predictions can be imagined, an immedi-
ate subsequent question is whether the classification quality im-
plied by our results (e.g., PRE ≈ 15 − 25%, REC ≈ 40 − 50%, and
FPR ≈ 0.1 − 0.5%) is good enough to support such mechanisms.
While we have not yet extensively studied such mechanisms, our
intuition is that this signal, although noisy, is useful. Consider, for
example, defense resource prioritization - it is evident that a heuris-
tic that uses this signal, as weak as it is, to prioritize resources is
better than randomly allocating resources (when capacity is con-
strained). Others have also experimented with a heuristic that har-
nesses the different response to similar requests between vulnera-
ble and robust users [4] to infer attack source(s) (although in the
context of a social network). In this case, even a vulnerability pre-
dictor significantly weaker than the one we have obtained here
has proven useful, leading to a technique that improves over the
state-of-the-art. While the above indicates that even low quality
predictions can still be used to improve defenses, we believe that
the prediction quality threshold above which these mechanisms
become valuable is context specific and we are studying this issue
in a related project.
Why do we focus on minimizing the false positive rate (FPR)? What
if the focus were on maximizing recall instead? We envisage that
the predictions made by our early warning system will be used
to better target existing defenses. As many of these defenses are
not lightweight and may lead to increased friction for users (e.g.,
rate-limiting outbound emails of vulnerable users to prevent an
attack outbreak, delaying incoming suspicious email addressed to
vulnerable users to give enough time for more robust users to re-
port mass-phishing emails), or allocating costly resources (e.g., hu-
man analyst time), the resulting cost of false positives is high: thus,
we have focused on minimizing the FPR at the expense of lower
recall. Other situations, however, offer a different cost/benefit bal-
ance between the false positive rate and recall. For these situations,
our classifier can be tuned by either using lower threshold values
(T as highlighted by the ROC across all CEs available in Figure 5),
or by specifically optimizing for recall.
What are the threats to validity? Our study indicates that it is feasi-
ble to harness account behaviour to predict the accounts that are
more likely to generate suspicious traffic in the future (an indica-
tor that they may be compromised). There are two main concerns
regarding the validity of our conclusions. The first one relates to
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the quality of the ground truth we use — this is a threat to valid-
ity common to any study using a methodology based on machine
learning.
The second one relates to the accuracy of the heuristics used
to avoid learning behavioural patterns from accounts that may be
controlled by an attacker (i.e., compromised or fake accounts) de-
tailed in §4.3. We prune: (i) all accounts flagged for suspicious ac-
tivity in the data window (DW) - as they are highly likely to be
compromised, (ii) all accounts flagged as suspicious in the buffer
window (BW) - as these accounts aremore likely to have been com-
promised but not yet flagged as such (thus contaminating our train-
ing data), (iii) all accounts which have been labeled as suspicious
at any point before the training data window - as our experience
shows that these accounts aremore likely to be compromised again
(in experiment CEC ); and, finally (iv) new / low activity accounts
(for which the system may not have enough history to determine
whether the accounts are fakes). We run various experiments that
compare the impact of these heuristics - even the most conserva-
tive experiments appear to support our conclusions.
It is worth discussing, however, the alternative: assume that our
heuristics fail to eliminate a large portion of attacker controlled
accounts. Even in this case, we believe that our pipeline provides
value through forecasting. Assume, for example, that these accounts
are predominantly (dormant) fakes that mimic legitimate user be-
haviour. In this case, our pipeline predicts the fakes that will likely
be ‘awakened’ by the attacker and start generating suspicious ac-
tivity. Assume, on the other side, that these are compromised ac-
counts not yet exploited by the attacker, then our pipeline predicts
which compromised accounts are under the control of the attacker
but not yet exploited. In this case as well the forecasting pipeline
can give an early sign of the attacker resources and strategy.
A final concern may be that our proposed approach may be
learning the heuristics by which some accounts are flagged as sus-
picious in the ground truth (other accounts in the ground truth
are flagged by humans). We believe that this represents a limited
threat due to the way we formulated our forecasting problem (i.e.,
making future predictions) as opposed to the underlying heuristics
which operate in real-time by design.
Why are the presented results positioned as lower-bounds? Our goal
was to test the feasibility of our proposed approach within con-
straints related to access to data and computational resources. We
believe that classification performance can be improved by: (i) ac-
cess to data beyond the login traces (e.g., email traces, or browsing
patterns) which are likely to contain additional information that
characterizes user behaviour; and (ii) additional computational re-
sources - as our exploration was constrained by run-time feasibil-
ity in terms of data preprocessing (e.g., to extract complex aggre-
gate features), model optimization, or sophisticated learning meth-
ods (e.g., deep neural networks) even though we used tens of com-
putational nodes.
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